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The clash in China between the reformers and the conservatives, and the resulting effects on Chinese domestic and foreign policy are discussed in this issue. Our lead article declares that "As modernization proceeds and as the two societies become more complex and tolerant of diversity, the ideological distance between the Soviet and the Chinese approaches to Marxism-Leninism will lessen greatly, if not entirely disappear. . . . It may not be too long before the Chinese and Soviet leaders meet face to face."

The New Era in Sino-Soviet Relations

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A BREAKTHROUGH in Sino-Soviet relations occurred in 1986. Although the decline, dating from 1958, had ceased in the late 1970's and had begun to tilt upward again in 1982, it took a new leadership in Moscow to make the correct policy assessment, send the right signals, and convince the Chinese that fundamental changes could ensue. And while ties between the two Communist giants had long ceased to be mended and broken merely on the basis of bilateral developments, the combination of the opening initiated by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at Vladivostok in July and the Chinese need for an extended period of international quiescence to support economic development at home made probable a favorable outcome to negotiations on long-standing major differences.

The upshot of improving relations was that both China and the Soviet Union could turn their attention to domestic reforms and to advancing their separate interests abroad without first having to worry that each other's actions and threats would constantly interfere with their fulfillment. Finally, the removal of tension in Sino-Soviet relations and the prospect for fundamental improvement promised to proceed in a manner not at variance with similar improvements in American-Soviet ties and continued good relations between the United States and China.

Historically, Sino-Soviet relations have been the product of five determinants. Each is still an important variable, but their content has changed sufficiently, in each case, to cause the shift that began in 1986. The first determinant has been the character of the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle. The American-Soviet leg has always been the most important, given the comparative importance of the two superpowers. If their relations change, Sino-Soviet (and Sino-American) concerns must vary as well. But since Washington–Moscow attitudes remained relatively constant during the post-World War II era, intra-triangular dynamism stems largely from variations of China's relations with the other two powers. Thus, when the United States was perceived as a threat to China during the 1950's, China's ties with the Soviet Union were reasonably good. When the Russians threatened, on the other hand, China's attitude toward the United States turned positive during the 1970's. If neither the Americans nor the Russians were perceived as hostile, Sino-Soviet relations could be judged on the merits of each issue, as during the first half of the 1980's. Finally, when the internal Chinese situation is "radical," Sino-Soviet ties will probably be "bad"; conversely, when the situation is "conservative," attitudes toward Moscow may improve (thus, Beijing–Moscow developments during the second halves of the 1960's and the 1980's).

Matters can also be analyzed as a set of bilateral issues in need of adjudication. The range of state issues is perhaps the most important of these: economic relations, troop dispositions, weapons strategies and, of course, the border question are all questions that determine the political distance between Moscow and Beijing. Another example is the so-called "three obstacles," (the Russian border force, Soviet military support of Vietnam in Kampuchea (Cambodia) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) which China claims the Soviet Union must overcome before genuine

improvement of ties can occur. A third issue is the interesting character of ideological differences. The original issues, so important to the origin and early development of the Sino-Soviet dispute, have largely disappeared. For the most part, they have been replaced by comparative attitudes stemming from changes—especially in China but since 1985 also in the Soviet Union—in their respective political and economic orders. A final issue is not even that; much of the "problem" of Sino-Soviet relations is merely the "atmosphere" produced by the bad blood between the two sides since the late 1950's (one might even say, the late 1920's). That will improve only when a new track record of positive accomplishments has been established.

The strategic triangle and bilateral issues go much of the way to explain what has happened between Beijing and Moscow. But more general factors are also influential. For instance, Sino-Soviet developments are an excellent example of what happens when two modernizing (i.e., increasingly powerful) states have to grapple with each other. As both increase their strength, their range of interests generally and toward each other changes, and with it, their attitudes and policies toward one another. Modernization, power, interest and policy are all closely related in this iron law of international relations. No amount of negotiation and agreement will eliminate the fact that the Soviet Union has accumulated many new interests in Asia stemming from its newly projectable power there or that latter-day economic modernization in China has enabled China to begin to assert itself around its peripheries and, with increasing conviction, in the Middle East and in the global strategic realm. Economic reform in the Soviet Union will accentuate this tendency only to the extent that Moscow is able to build up power more rapidly.

Sino-Soviet relations are also a textbook illustration of what can happen when two different political cultures interact once power and interest bring them into increasing contact. There is an annoying racial element in Russian and Chinese attitudes, and hence policies, toward each other. The personalities of the top decision makers—China's Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai, and present leader Deng Xiaoping, and Soviet leaders Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev—helped set the tone and the direction of Moscow-Beijing developments. Each nation has a national style that influences the process of negotiations, often rubbing the other the wrong way and helping to determine, for instance, what kinds of military strategies and levels of deployments to field against the other.

Finally, China and Russia have historical memories of varying intensities and length. China selectively recalls negative aspects of past encounters with Russia, as during the eighteenth and nineteenth century border negotiations, and with the Soviet Union, as during the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in the 1960's. The Kremlin selectively recalls the Mongol invasions many centuries ago and the enormous rise of Chinese population levels as justification for overreacting to the 1969 border clashes and overarming the border with China thereafter. Political culture and the expression of these qualities configure the extent and direction of Sino-Soviet relations.

A REVOLUTION IN WEAPONRY

What happens between Moscow and Beijing turns on trends and events over which neither has much control. Since World War II, a triple revolution in weaponry has occurred: infinite destructability, infinite accuracy and instant delivery. Soviet and Chinese military budgets must reflect these realities, and their security policies toward each other must take these developments as given. Many of their respective military policies follow. In the political sphere, the lateral diffusion of power across the Northern Hemisphere, the rise of economic interdependence, and the emergence of North-South relations all constrain how far the Kremlin and Tian An Men can go in competing (indeed, cooperating) with each other throughout the globe. The world is experiencing the increasing dominance of technological change. Moscow and Beijing have found themselves increasingly far behind the West. Their separate but increasingly similar domestic reform movements are partial responses to the need to catch up lest they fall permanently behind. That commonality eliminates areas of discord and hence tends to draw them together.

Another example of systemic influences is the trend toward arms control. The United States and the Soviet Union have found, over the last three decades, a need to limit through negotiated agreements at least some of the destructive potential of contemporary weapons systems. As it rises to global military status, China also finds its security affected by the state of play in this aspect of American-Soviet talks, whereas the superpowers themselves tend more and more to take the Chinese to be a virtual third element at the negotiating table.

On the basis of a "weighted average" of the influence of these five determinants of Sino-Soviet relations, it is possible to forward some probable statements about the future. Three developments seem all but certain. First, the border question (and hence the troop disposition issue) is ripe for rapid resolution. The border issue has never been supremely important for its own sake, since all that is at stake is a number of small islands in the Ussuri and Amur Rivers, and the exact location of the boundary in the Tien Shan Mountains that forms the division between Xinjiang Uygur and Uzbekistan.

The only point of real difference has been the own-

ership of the Hei Hsai Tzu Tao at the confluence of the two rivers directly across from downtown Khabarovsk. The Russians illegally seized this land from the Chinese in the nineteenth century. But it is this island that Gorbachev in effect told the Chinese they could have back in his July, 1986, Vladivostok speech, when he assented to the Thalweg (channel course) Principle as the means of determining who owns the island. The two nations have already agreed to send out joint boundary locating teams, which will report back on completing their work in about two years.

The more important problem of the level and kind of forces arrayed along both sides of the boundary must, of course, be dealt with as well. But this, too, is well on the way to solution, as the Soviet General Secretary, in the same Vladivostok speech, announced token Soviet troop withdrawals (one division) out of Mongolia, with the promise of more to come as negotiations proceeded. While it would be too much to expect a total demilitarization of the Sino-Soviet border, à la the Rush-Bagot Treaty establishing the American-Canadian boundary, some kind of arms control agreement between Moscow and Beijing appears to be in the offing. That would have to see the drawing down of a significant portion of the 50-plus Soviet divisions, the over 2,500 aircraft, and the more than 1,200 nuclear missiles deployed against China, as well as somewhat smaller relocations of Chinese forces.

It is true that such an agreement could be followed by the appearance of an additional 20 or 30 Soviet divisions across the Iranian border, ready to invade the Persian Gulf area. That would be a strategic disaster for the West (to say nothing of similar possibilities of Chinese forces reconfigured to attack Taiwan or India or Vietnam). But the chances are reasonably good that these forces will in fact revert to skeleton status, as both countries seek to benefit economically from a reduced military burden. Indeed, that may be a principal motive on the Soviet side.

A third near certainty is increasingly close economic and cultural ties. Having been so completely estranged for a quarter century, the potential for improvement is vast. Both nations have come to realize the need for better state-to-state and people-to-people relations. The economics-first policy orientation in both capitals can only drive trade to record levels (it is already increasing steeply each year). And each society is comparatively liberal-reformist at home, so that political attitudes and social structures tend to dovetail rather than diverge, as they did during the Cultural Revolution.

Leninist-directed societies tend to have many institutions and policies in common to start with; Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping are pulling their respective societies in similar directions. This is of historic magnitude: two of the world's three largest and most powerful nations are, for the first time (even compared with the positivist orientation of the 1950's), approaching each other in a spirit of commonality and friendship. Each is genuinely interested in the other; each realizes the other has much to offer; and each has come to admit that the other has legitimate rights and needs. Out of such feelings lovers patch up their quarrels and nations establish a solid base for broad and long-lasting rapprochement. That is exactly what is happening in Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1980's.

On the strength of these three near certainties, then, ties between Moscow and Beijing will develop rapidly in coming years. That enhances the likelihood, if not the surety, of four other developments. The first is the lessening of any ideological differences. Ideology has long since ceased to be a central aspect of Sino-Soviet differences; the Kremlin and the Tian An Men early on exhausted themselves and essentially, each gave up trying to convert the other. But a fundamental change has taken place, first in China after 1976 and then in the Soviet Union after 1984: both countries took as their first task the all-around, rapid modernization of their economies and a concomitant freeing up of social and (to a lesser extent) political controls. Both concluded that the strict central planning, state ownership, party-direction style of economic development had failed. Each admitted that the economy—and with it living standards, cultural levels and modes of political leadership and expression—was a disaster and that nothing short of major movement toward a mixed economy would suffice.

Such a process of repair, now well under way in both nations, will occupy the policy attention of both parties for the next decade. Facing common problems of similar origin and adopting not-dissimilar solutions, Gorbachev and Deng have found they have more to talk about and that old arguments have become increasingly irrelevant. Thus, each has begun to eye the other's efforts with cautious approval, and a symbiotic relationship between them has begun to emerge.

As modernization proceeds and as the two societies become more complex and tolerant of diversity, the ideological distance between the Soviet and the Chinese approaches to Marxism-Leninism will lessen greatly, if not entirely disappear. Already gone are the notions of ideological primacy, of the absolute correctness of one model of socioeconomic organization, and of the unqualified superiority of socialism. It may not be too long before the Chinese and Soviet leaders meet face to face not only to sign a new border treaty but to talk over common ideological problems stemming from latter-day modernization.

A similar likelihood follows from the lessening of tensions associated with differences in stages of modernization. The Soviet Union began economic modernization in earnest in the late 1920's, and political modernization (e.g., the emergence of mass nation-

alism and popular participation in politics) started earlier in the century. In China's case, economic modernization took firm hold (after a few false starts) only in the 1950's and even then suffered the twin setbacks of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Political modernization preceeded it, as in the Soviet case, by two decades and, like the Soviet instance, further progress (i.e., toward democracy) was short-circuited by Leninist-Stalinist-Maoist totalitarianism.

But China regained momentum in the mid-1970's and rapidly made up for lost time, while the Soviet Union began Gorbachev-induced *glasnost-perestroika* (openness and reconstruction) only a decade later. Further, Chinese emphasis on consumer satisfaction and agricultural productivity has meant that differences in living standards in the two countries are markedly less than they were in 1965. If modernization can be described in terms of stages (preconditions, take-off, drive for maturity, industrialized society, and so on), the Soviet Union is somewhere short of becoming a fully industrialized society, even seven decades after the Bolshevik Revolution, while China is clearly far beyond take-off and driving hard toward full industrialization. The distance between the two is therefore much less than it was two decades ago and, to the extent that Chinese progress continues to be faster than Soviet, the gap will continually narrow.

A third likelihood concerns the foreign policy implications of Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the context of primary attention in the Soviet Union and China to domestic economic development. Heretofore, a third of a century's enmity has gone far to configure, and in several regions to freeze, the balance of power, especially in Asia. With both Moscow and Beijing interested in reasonably good relations with their neighbors in order to avoid conflict and enhance trade, and with improving ties among themselves, those balances may well undergo change. In particular, the international relations of all three Asian regions, until recently highly dependent on Sino-Soviet enmity for their form, will probably change. In northeast Asia, the Soviet Union has supported (with reservations, to be sure) North Korean policy toward the South, while China has moved (in fact, although not often admitted in public) to the side of South Korea and has become Seoul's second security guarantor, after the United States.

In southeast Asia, Moscow has bankrolled Vietnam's economy and has supplied the military wherewithal for its invasion/occupation of Kampuchea. China, fearing a southeast Asia entirely under Hanoi's control, has stood behind Thailand, again along with the United States, has occasionally moved directly against the Vietnamese, and has assisted the three Cambodian rebel groups against Pnom Penh.

In south Asia, China and the United States have long supported Pakistan, especially since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, whereas Moscow since the early 1970's has leaned toward India. These policies, the partial product of the Sino-Soviet dispute, could well change once rapprochement has advanced a bit further. In particular, Moscow would not feel the necessity to take such military risks as it now does on the Korean Peninsula; and Vietnam and China could come to an understanding (which, if the United States improved its relations with Hanoi simultaneously, might find Moscow isolated in southeast Asia). And on the subcontinent, improved Sino-Soviet relations could lead to the necessity, felt in both Islamabad and New Delhi, to work out their differences unsupported by a superpower presence. "Unglueing" these regional equations could indeed lead to instability. But both the Communist powers have every interest in avoiding conflict and further rivalry there. Change, if nothing else, will be the order of the day.

THE STRATEGIC TRIANGLE

A final likelihood is increasing Chinese participation in American-Soviet affairs. Several examples come to mind. One is the growing Chinese weight at the arms control negotiating table. Whether the topic is strategic missile reduction talks, negotiations concerning intermediate nuclear force levels, or conventional force draw-downs, the Chinese element is growing in importance, even though Beijing does not sit at any of the ongoing talks. The United States has come to play the role of China's representative in dealing with the Russians in this arena—witness the wrangling over where and how many Soviet SS-20 missiles should be allowed in a new treaty.

None of the members of the strategic triangle wish China actually to become an active third party, because the degree of complexity would rise so much as to endanger the success of the talks. But China's role must be taken into account more and more as its military power grows, as it must. The same is true of the emerging Chinese nuclear missile and submarine forces; for a decade or more, they have been of concern only to Moscow, but with the deployment of a true intercontinental range missile and a fleet of nuclear missile-launching submarines, China becomes a nuclear threat to the United States as well. The global strategic equation is thereby trilateralized.

A third example is arms sales. In 1987, China has become the world's third largest arms exporter and has made itself an important element in conflicts like

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

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10,000 joint organizations of this sort were in existence.

As China enters the post-Deng era, its strategy for scientific and technological modernization will increasingly reflect the attempt to combine elements ofstate and market. State-led policies—many of which will be a product of the leading group for science and technology—will be aimed at developing an adequate infrastructure for promoting indigenous development and absorbing foreign technology, while the market will be used to ensure that enterprise and research managers are concerned with innovation opportunities. This strategy, in many respects, is one that is being used by many of the newly industrialized Asian nations. While this strategy may not be able to produce all desired technological advances or create overall technological competitiveness, it certainly influences the process.

At the same time, however, there are strict limits on scientific reform unless political and economic reforms are also introduced. In the political realm, these reforms will have to include a further diminished role for the Communist party in the research sector, as well as an improvement in the status and treatment of scientific intellectuals. Some of this has begun with the recent housecleaning that has taken place at the level of China's municipal and provincial science and technology commissions.

Yet, while such changes have proceeded, the political demonstrations and subsequent events of 1986–1987, involving the removal of Fang Lizhi as vice president of the University of Science and Technology in Hefei and the seemingly forced resignations of Lu Jiaxi and Yan Dongsheng, respectively president and vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, remind us that change will not be easy in China. The issue is not so much that China will require a democratic political system to make progress as the fact that sociopolitical changes and scientific and technological changes cannot be divorced from one another. This is an issue with which China has been grappling for over 150 years. For better or worse, it will be continued as Chinese leaders map out their future modernization strategy.

In the economic realm, further price reform is essential. Until there is substantial price reform, the technology market will not function effectively, and the issue of price will limit the number of persons who will turn to this type of mechanism to sell or acquire technical know-how. Management training is another essential element. As many Western nations have learned, it is management that makes technology work and not vice versa. All too often, Chinese factory managers still consider technological innovation to be more of a bother than a benefit; they are afraid to accept the risk of employing a new product or component when they feel secure with their existing technology. Chinese managers need to understand the role of technology and how to use technology to their advantage.

Most important, the effort to attain substantial levels of growth and technological advance can only be accomplished after a workable scientific and technological infrastructure has been put into place. Policies for science and technology are part of an entire package, involving all sorts of inputs ranging from finance to marketing. Over the last year, China has taken some bold steps to stimulate forward momentum. The success of this effort will not come from rigid adherence to catchy themes or strategies based on the political fear of falling behind. Rather, the long-term viability of China's present "mixed strategy" will be determined by allowing the strategy to evolve in conjunction with the further changes that are needed in the economic system.

Government policy can have its desired impact only when the economic signals being sent to various actors in the system are, on balance, logical and internally consistent. In this regard, Deng Xiaoping is correct; what is needed is a Chinese type of modernization, sensitive to both the size and the complexity of the Chinese economy and the political system. Out of this search for a Chinese style of modernization may come a model for combining state-led initiatives with market forces more effectively than most developing nations or socialist countries have yet been able do. ■

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

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the Iran-Iraq War and the resistance against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. What can happen is graphically displayed by the Iranian deployment of Chinese "Silkworm" missiles astride the Persian Gulf, ready to strike American-flagged vessels. Such moves force both superpowers to react. These kinds of Chinese "interventions" in affairs that previously were the exclusive province of the Americans and Russians will rise in number and seriousness to the extent that Chinese power grows and the strategic triangle stabilizes in equilateral form.

The list of certainties and likelihoods in future Sino-Soviet relations indicates that things will change greatly. But other factors will tend to hold back the upswing, so that on balance the trend will not be so revolutionary as the above developments would indicate. In at least three areas, the most important developments are negative. For instance, it is improbable that the Soviet Union will consent to remove all three "obstacles" demanded by China as a condition to improving Sino-Soviet ties. The Kremlin cannot pull its forces out of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, drop its sup-

port of Vietnam and evacuate its fleet from Camn Rahn Bay, and pull out of Afghanistan voluntarily, as the Chinese specify, and still remain an Asian power.

The Soviet Union might be willing to meet the Chinese halfway on the Sino-Soviet border troop disposition issue, as a means of clearing the deck for further melioration, but it cannot simultaneously drop ties to the Vietnam nor summarily restore the status quo ante in Afghanistan. Pulling out of Asia would merely drop Moscow to the rank of a regional power, and Beijing knows full well the impossibility of its "demands." The real reason why the Chinese have advanced such an impossible set of requirements is that Beijing wants to have some cards it can deal away in return for Soviet concessions on the important question, the border troops.

Another improbability concerns the removal of race, personality, historical memory, and other elements from ongoing Sino-Soviet relations. The Russians cannot forget Genghis Kahn; the Chinese cannot forget the Russian treaty violations or Stalin's bad behavior. Every Chinese leader will have a strong personality and will, if history is any guide, rub any strong Russian leader the wrong way. Chinese and Russian political cultures will continue to produce misunderstandings; they are too different and they will not meld under the influences of Leninism and modernization.

A final improbability is the return of severe Sino-Soviet tensions, to say nothing of Sino-Soviet conflict, in the twentieth century. Both countries have too much to lose by such a turn of events; both have "learned their lesson" of the last quarter century; and neither can afford the material and policy costs of a return to the 1960's and 1970's. The near-impossibility of a reversal of the slowly improving direction of Sino-Soviet relations is perhaps the most important development in Sino-Soviet ties since the emergence of the dispute in the late 1950's and is one of the basic facts of contemporary international relations. On that is grounded the stability of the strategic triangle and—along with American and Soviet needs for external peace to address their respective internal crises—it militates strongly for peace during the next decade or more.

With tensions reduced to a minimum, moreover, Moscow and Beijing can address their practical differences on their merits. For the first time since the early 1960's (when it had much less projectable power), China can involve itself in countries and situations far from its borders. That presages the time, fast approaching, when Beijing (like Washington and Moscow) finds interests to go along with its burgeoning power and becomes the world's third superpower.

[illegible] remains to point out two impossibilities in Sino-[illegible]. The first is the impossibility of a Sino-[illegible] from some American-Soviet [illegible] desire to initiate war [illegible] to a conflict stemming from misdirection, accident, incident or the other's involvement in a conflict that does not also see American participation. Once again, that propensity on both sides is a major stabilizing element and militates strongly for peace.

The problem is that an American-Soviet conflict is still possible, that such a conflict would probably grow into a third world war, that China would in the end become involved, and that the present combination of American strategies and Soviet force configurations makes such a conflict not entirely improbable. Once a war began, it would spread quickly to Asia, and if the Russians succeeded in conquering Europe and destroying America (both possibilities), it would then have every incentive to turn on China with all its force, conquer that nation and establish a world empire. That sounds far-fetched, and superpower conflict is still highly improbable. But when the American and Soviet strategies enter into the equation, together with the massive imbalance in conventional forces in favor of the Soviet Union and the geopolitical advantage of the United States, a recipe is produced that greatly increases the probability of conflict. So the danger of Sino-Soviet conflict, so low in the direct sense and so unlikely in Asia (with, perhaps, the significant exception of Korea), rises as one moves to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Europe and Central America.

The second impossibility is restoration of a 1950's-style "hard" Sino-Soviet alliance against the United States (or of an American-Soviet or an American-Chinese alliance). Neither Moscow nor Beijing has any interest in such a development. Both Communist states strongly desire flexibility and freedom of decision in their foreign policies. Both must put most of their energies into domestic economic development and need the United States as a supplier of technology and (in China's instance) of capital. A new Sino-Soviet alliance would spell the end of any of these possibilities, and thus will be avoided. It is still true, on the other hand, that Beijing and Moscow could well agree to some spheres of influence agreement—Chinese primacy in Asia and Soviet ascendancy in the Middle East, with Africa and Latin America left as areas in which to compete. But that is unlikely. And if that possibility is all but eliminated, the prospect for stability and development both in the strategic triangle and in global affairs is high. That, indeed, seems likely.

Problems remain. With domestic crises in the United States and the Soviet Union; with the global economic system constantly teetering at the brink of collapse; and with the locus of military threat shifting rapidly to the third world, the twin processes of superpower conflict resolution and third world revolutionary modernization could be interrupted. But for the first time since the Korean War, relations among America, China, and the Soviet Union are not the critical determinants of war and peace on this planet. ■